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ABSTRACT 
Recent debate on Irish foreign policy has often been framed by the presumed influence of 
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the dependence of the Irish economy on 
Foreign Direct Investment from the US.  More broadly, small states are generally assumed 
to have little significant influence on world events. Empirical research on these issues is 
difficult in the Irish context given the often guarded nature of Irish foreign policy 
pronouncements. Ireland’s term on the UN Security Council in 2001 and 2002 offers an 
opportunity both to examine Irish foreign policy decision-making at the highest international 
level and to look at the capacity of a small state to have influence. The results of this study 
suggest that contrary to common perceptions, Irish diplomats on the Council did regularly 
disagree with the US on foreign-policy decisions and that the influence of EU membership 
was very limited—primarily because there was often no common European policy on the 
most controversial issues. Ireland can, however, be seen to have influenced a number of key 
decisions made by the Council during its most recent term as an elected member. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ireland’s two-year term on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2001 and 2002 
offers an opportunity to examine the state’s diplomatic engagement across a wide range of 
issues of relevance to international peace and security.  Ireland has served on the Security 
Council only twice previously: for a full term in 1981-2 and  a ‘half term’ of 12 months in 
1962.  This most recent term would, however, prove to be different from the first two in many 
respects.  In the post-Cold War period the Security Council has been in almost permanent 
session—compared with its tradition in earlier eras of holding meetings periodically.  The 
Council, despite the continuing importance of informal consultations, now meets more often 
in public session and is somewhat more transparent in the way it works.  In addition, the 
advent of the Internet means that the verbatim records of public meetings, notes on many 
‘closed meetings’, Presidential statements, council communiqués and voting records are 
readily available for analysis. 
This article examines Ireland’s role on the Security Council in 2001 and 2002, 
thereby contributing to an understanding of the scope and direction of Irish foreign policy at 
the beginning of the 21st century. Given that speeches and votes in the Council are 
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recorded, the article will focus on those issues that were dealt with in public sessions and on 
which votes were taken during Ireland’s term of office.1 Inevitably this means that some 
issues on which the council was inactive or, more typically, deadlocked are not examined. 
While such issues would be relevant to an analysis of the failures of the UN system, Ireland 
could have done little to resolve these matters or to break the deadlock given the structure of 
the Security Council, within which  a pre-eminent role is given to the veto-holding five 
permanent members and the ten elected members are in a less powerful position. 
Nonetheless many contentious policy areas were debated in public session and Ireland 
played an important role in these debates, and there were many occasions when Ireland did 
have to make difficult and potentially controversial choices. 
For a small country, Ireland has contributed a very large number of troops to UN 
peacekeeping and peace support missions.2  In addition, through involvement with UN 
humanitarian agencies and with non-governmental organisations working with or funded by 
UN agencies, a significant number of Irish people have direct personal experience of 
working with the UN system.  Recent referenda on alterations to EU treaties have included 
significant debates on the future of European security arrangements.  This was perhaps 
most graphically captured by the poster during the referendum on the Nice Treaty that 
starkly said ‘Hello NATO good-bye UN’3. The debate has, however, been more complex 
than a simple dichotomy between supporters of Irish involvement in UN peacekeeping 
missions versus those promoting an armed EU or Ireland’s membership of NATO. On 
occasions, a clear majority of the Irish public has wished ‘something to be done’ by some 
organisation with military capacity—such as in relation to events in Rwanda or Somalia and 
more recently in Liberia and the Congo. There has, however, been great public unease 
about some military developments, such as the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which triggered 
some of the largest public protests in Ireland in recent years. On the other hand, there was 
little very public discussion about Irish army involvement in NATO-led operations in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, where the troops’ rules of engagement were more robust than those employed 
by traditional peacekeepers but where the operations were seen as non-aggressive and 
peace supporting and, crucially, had UN Security Council authorization.   
There is another dimension to the Irish foreign policy agenda, one that arises as a 
consequence of our economic reliance on foreign investment and foreign trade. Debate on 
matters that are perceived to have an impact in this area tends to be focused on Ireland’s 
narrow state interests and therefore can lead to decisions that appear to be at variance with 
the declared values of Irish foreign policy. The debate on Iraq was often framed in this way, 
and recent discussions on the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy reflected the 
very explicit tension between Ireland’s own interests in agricultural subsidies versus our 
support for global development. In particular, public debate has raised questions about the 
independence of Irish foreign policy given the importance of US foreign direct investment to 
the Irish economy. In a slightly different context, critics of EU integration have voiced 
concerns that the development of a common foreign and security policy has constrained 
Ireland’s capacity to act and has more closely aligned Ireland with the wealthy states of the 
Global North. 
An analysis of Ireland’s performance on the Security Council provides an insight into 
Irish foreign policy in practice and into the way in which ideals and state interests are 
balanced. In particular, this paper examines the extent to which Ireland’s decision-making 
during its most recent term on the Council was constrained by EU membership or by a 
desire not to oppose the US, in such a way as to suggest a break from more traditional 
modes of Irish foreign policy.  It also examines the extent to which a small state can have 
                                                 
1Details of all the speeches, votes and resolutions discussed in this article can be found on 
the UN Security Council web site, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/  ( 1 July 2004)  
2 Irish soldiers and Gardai have completed approximately 50,000 tours of duty with the UN 
since 1958. 
3The first, defeated, referendum was held on 9 June 2001; the second referendum, which was 
passed, was held on 19 October 2002. 
3 
any meaningful impact in such a forum as the Security Council—dominated as that body is 
by more powerful states. 
 
THE WIDER CONTEXT 
 
This study forms part of the debate on the role of small states in the international system.  
Robert Keohane’s classic article in 1969 reviewed the state of research at that point.3  He 
argued that analysis had so often confused ‘smallness’ and non-alignment and that very little 
progress had been made on research into the question of whether small states did have 
unique characteristics that made their foreign policies different from the policies of larger 
states.  Indeed, this is still a salient point in the literature today.  The post-Cold War literature 
on the debate about the foreign policy of small states has been over-focused on the issue of 
alliances and the question of autonomy for small states, notwithstanding the alteration in the 
international system following the end of the Cold War.4  Small states are almost always 
presented in the literature as victims trying to protect themselves from the international 
system and/or from larger states.  There has been too little work done on the capacity (or 
incapacity) of small states to pursue proactive international policies that go beyond the need 
to defend themselves from ‘external’ threats. 
Keohane argued that small states are those that can be categorised broadly as 
states effectively forced to simply adapt to the international system and that have no 
leverage with which to exert influence.  They are ‘system ineffectual’.5  He cites Robert 
Rothstein’s study of small states, which suggests that such states are more likely to support 
international organisations because of the formal equality accorded to all sates within such 
international bodies and also out of hope of enjoying some form of collective security.6  This 
argument is problematic, given the experience of failure that has tended to be characteristic  
of collective security organisations. However, Keohane concludes that small-state support 
for multilateralism is rational, because whatever the failures of multilateral action, small- and 
even medium-sized states have no hope whatsoever of making an international impact if 
they act alone.  Small states acting within international fora can play a ‘systemic role’ in 
seeking to shape codes and rules of behaviour.7   Ireland has made this argument in the 
past and it is restated in the contribution by Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen, in this 
volume. The question that remains, however, in spite of the aspirations of small states, is 
can they achieve their goals by acting in this way?  Can small states have an impact on 
multilateral norms or do the most powerful states inevitably dominate?  
Within the European Union the role of small states has been discussed in the 
literature in the context of European political cooperation.8 Small states have a particular 
interest in how EU foreign policy develops: will they be swamped by the more powerful 
states and end up losing any sense of independent foreign policy, or can they influence the 
common foreign policy? In the Irish context there is a quite limited literature based on 
                                                 
3Robert O. Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics’,  
International Organization 23(2) (1969), 291–310. 
4See for example: Gerd Nonneman, ‘Saudi–European relations 1902–2001: a pragmatic 
quest for relative autonomy’, International Affairs 77 (3) 2001, 631–61; Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner 
(eds) Small states and alliances (Heidelberg, 2001); Mary Ann Tetreault ‘Autonomy, necessity, and 
the small state: ruling Kuwait in the twentieth century’, International Organization 45(4) 1991, 565–91; 
and David Vital, The inequality of states (Oxford, 1967). 
5Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas’,  295. 
6Robert Rothstein, Alliances and small powers (New York, 1968), 44–5. 
7Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas’, 297. 
8See, for example, Paul Sharp, Irish foreign policy and the European Community :a study of 
the impact of interdependence on the foreign policy of a small state (Aldershot, 1990); Kenneth Hanf 
and Ben Soetendor (eds), Adapting to European integration: small states and the European Union 
(New York, 1998).  
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empirical analysis. With the exception of Ben Tonra’s work comparing the Europeanisation 
of foreign policy in Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark up to 1996 9, much of the debate 
has been focused either on the internal foreign policy-making processes of the EU or on 
individual case studies. Tonra’s study concludes that policy-makers in the three states he 
explored saw the EU as constraining all members—large and small—while offering small 
states a greater capacity for real international influence. He adds, however, that the public in 
Ireland and Denmark do not share their policy-makers’ views and see foreign policy 
coordination as a largely negative cost of membership.10 Are Tonra’s findings still 
applicable? Is the development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy a 
constraining influence, pulling Ireland away from the declared values of its national foreign 
policy, or is the EU an effective platform for advancement of some foreign policy without 
placing a straight jacket on the state’s actions across the range of foreign policy decision-
making in other international fora?  
 
THE STUDY OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
The history of Ireland’s early involvement in the League of Nations and the United Nations, 
from 1919 to the mid 1960s, has been analysed in earlier work by Michael Kennedy and Joe 
Skelly.11  More recently, the 1996 White Paper on Irish foreign policy captured the tension 
between ideals and state interests when it set out the values that underlie Ireland’s foreign 
policy as follows (paras 1 and 2): 
 
1. Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is a 
statement of the kind of people we are. Irish people are committed to the principles 
set out in Article 29 of the Constitution for the conduct of international relations: the 
ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international 
justice and morality;  and  
 
2. Ireland is small and hugely dependent on external trade for its well-being. We do 
not have a sufficiently large domestic market or adequate natural resources to enable 
our economy to thrive in isolation. As we depend for our survival on a regulated 
international environment in which the rights and interests of even the smallest are 
protected, our interests require us to pursue an active policy of external engagement. 
 
The tension between ideals and state interests described in the White Paper has been seen 
to strongly influence foreign policy decision-making in the recent debates on Iraq, with the 
importance of US investment for the Irish economy being regularly cited as the most 
important reason for not being more critical of the US invasion.12
                                                 
9Ben Tonra, The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign 
policy in the European Union (Aldershot, 2001). 
10Tonra, The Europeanisation of national foreign policy, 284. 
11 Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946: international relations, diplomacy 
and politics (Dublin, 1996); Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds) Irish foreign policy, 
1919-66: from independence to internationalism (Dublin, 2000); Joseph Morrison Skelly, Irish 
diplomacy at the United Nations 1945-1965: national interests and the international order (Dublin, 
1997).  For more recent background see John Doyle and Eileen Connolly ‘Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Politics: a study of the 2002 election in the Republic of Ireland’, Irish Studies in International 
Affairs, vol. 13: 151-166, 2002; Eileen Connolly and John Doyle The place of the United Nations in 
contemporary Irish foreign policy”, pp 362-83,  in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre MacMahon Ireland 
and the United Nations: 1955-2005. Dublin: IPA and Dept of Foreign Affairs, 2005.  
12See, for example, Sunday Times (London), 23 February 2003; Business and Finance, 13 
February 2003. 
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In late 2000, just before Ireland joined the Security Council, Minister Cowen argued 
against an analysis of foreign policy on the basis of values versus interests. He said it was 
not an either/or situation because small states could not compete in a power-seeking 
international system run by realist principles. Ireland, he argued, ‘like most small nations has 
always known that a multilateral rules-based international order is in our national interest. 
We would like to think, and I believe with much justification that we have demonstrated this, 
that our commitment to liberal internationalism is also based on principle.’13
Following the end of Ireland’s term on the Council and after extensive criticism of the 
stance the government had taken on the war on Iraq, Minister Cowen re-iterated the 
government’s commitment to multilateralism. He said, ‘…the complex of challenges facing 
the international community cannot be resolved through unilateral action by any one country, 
or group of countries—no matter how large the resources or resolute the determination.’ He 
then went on to quote and support UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s point made in the 
Millennium Declaration Implementation Report 2003; ‘…Challenges to peace and security 
today are predominantly global … They require complex and collective responses, which are 
possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed and properly 
used.’14
 
KEY ISSUES DURING THE 2001–2 SECURITY COUNCIL TERM 
The end of the Cold War saw the UNSC move into almost permanent session as the level of 
uncertainty in the international order increased. During Ireland’s two year term as an elected 
member (beginning 1 January 2001) there were 430 meetings of the Council. The range of 
issues dealt with was vast and required Irish diplomats to be familiar with the situation in 
areas where they had no diplomatic presence and where there were few historical and 
contemporary links with Ireland. The following sections seek to focus on the key issues 
debated over the two years of Ireland’s presence on the Council and also examine some of 
the process issues involved in the management of Ireland’s term by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Collectively, the next sections of the paper give a good insight into the detail 
of Irish diplomatic activity. 
Ethiopia–Eritrea 
During Ireland’s first week on the council the US renewed its bid to lift the UN-imposed arms 
embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea.15 There was broad support for this US position among the 
Council’s permanent members and there was speculation that an end to the embargo had 
been privately promised to the Ethiopians by the US during ceasefire talks in 2000. At an 
early stage Ireland took the position with regard to this matter that the conditions for lifting 
the embargo16 had not been met. Irish diplomats believe that Ireland played an important 
role in persuading the other four new members of the Council (Colombia, Mauritius, Norway 
and Singapore) to take a similar position. Following this, Britain and France shifted their 
position—from tentative support for the US to a decision to abstain—thus denying the draft 
resolution on lifting the embargo the nine positive votes required for it to pass. The embargo 
thus remained in place until May 2001, when it expired under the ‘sunset’ provisions of 
resolution 1298.  
 
                                                 
13Brian Cowen, ‘Challenges to Liberal Internationalism’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 
12 (2001), 2. 
14Brian Cowen, Speech to annual conference of the National Committee for the Study of 
International Affairs, Academy House, 14 November 2003, re-printed in this volume. 
15The arms embargo had been adopted on 17 May 2000 as resolution 1298. 
16Such conditions had been set out in resolution 1298 as being ‘a peaceful definitive 
settlement’ to the conflict.  
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Iraq 
The security council’s discussions on Iraq in 2001–2 can be divided into two phases. Up to 
mid 2002 the focus was on the impact of the sanctions regime, with many countries, 
including Ireland, seeking reform of the system to ensure a better flow of civilian goods into 
Iraq while at the same time maintaining military sanctions. After President George W. Bush’s  
11 September anniversary speech to the UN General Assembly,17 however, and under US 
pressure, the UNSC debates focused almost entirely on Iraq’s alleged programme of 
weapons of mass destruction.  
In 2001 and early 2002 UNSC discussion on Iraq focused primarily on the sanctions 
regime. The US and British approach was to adjust and prolong sanctions by allowing some 
additional imports to Iraq, balanced against the country’s oil earnings. There was, however, 
a lot of pressure on the US and Britain to agree to some reform of the sanctions regime on 
humanitarian grounds. In response to this pressure, Britain and the US proposed the 
creation of a Goods Review List (GRL)—a broad range of potentially dual use items that 
would still require the approval of the Sanctions Committee. Ireland unsuccessfully argued 
that Iraq should be allowed to operate in the economic field as normally as possible, 
consistent with preventing it from rearming, pending fulfilment of its obligations as set out in 
previous UN resolutions since the end of the First Gulf War. In Ireland’s view, therefore, 
merely allowing Iraq to import goods was not sufficient: Iraq should also be able to import 
capital for investment (for example, by obtaining World Bank loans), engage foreign 
consultants, have international air links, etc.  The US and Britain opposed this approach as 
too far-reaching while Russia (and Iraq) opposed the whole idea of a GRL on the grounds 
that it would defuse the pressure for an end to sanctions and lead to an almost permanent 
status for sanctions.  Ultimately, in the atmosphere that existed post 11 September 2001, the 
GRL concept was adopted without any of the wider reforms sought by Ireland and without a 
commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the sanctions issue as sought by Russia.18
At this time Ireland also argued that future sanctions regimes should have a specified 
time limit—to avoid a situation whereby sanctions can be kept in place by the veto power of 
one permanent member of the Security Council. While this approach was applied in practice 
from 2001 onwards, it was not adopted as formal, standard Council policy because of US 
opposition.  
Early Council debates on the claims that Iraq was developing weapons of mass 
destruction focused on two key issues: firstly, the extent to which a new UNSC resolution on 
weapons inspections would ‘automatically’ lead to action by member states to ‘enforce’ the 
resolution without further Security Council decision; and secondly the new conditions under 
which UN weapons inspectors would operate. Early US–British drafts allowed for one 
resolution, which would authorise member states to use ‘all means necessary’ (i.e. use 
military action) to force Iraq to comply with the terms of the resolution. The US–British drafts 
also sought to give the Permanent Five on the Council special privileges as regards the 
direction of the inspectors in their work. With regard to the issue of ‘automatic action’, Ireland 
did not favour such an approach. The Irish position was explicitly for a two-stage process, 
whereby the UNSC would decide whether or not Iraq was in breach of the inspection regime 
and if such an occasion arose would at that point decide what to do. In relation to the 
inspections regime, Hans Blix, the UN’s chief weapons inspector1, supported some of the 
proposed ‘tougher’ rules while opposing those that he felt were unnecessary and 
counterproductive. Ireland was among a group of countries that strongly supported Blix; and 
most of the more objectionable provisions were removed from the final resolution. 
The unanimous adoption of resolution 1441on 8 November 2002 gave Iraq a ‘final 
opportunity’ to comply with previous resolutions on disclosure of its weapons programmes. 
                                                 
1712 September 2002. 
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available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/. (1 July 2004.) 
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Commission (UNMOVIC). 
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The Irish government faced some domestic criticism for supporting the motion. In its 
explanation for having voted in favour of the resolution, the government explicitly stated that 
it was for the UNSC to decide if Iraq committed a ‘material breach’ of its obligations, in 
accordance with the use of that term in international law, and that only the Council and not 
individual members could then decide what action should ensue.19
During its term on the UNSC , Ireland’s interventions in Council debates were clear in 
their opposition to open-ended sanctions against Iraq, in their support for the UNSC 
remaining central to decision-making on the possibility of action against Iraq and in their 
opposition to armed intervention without UN approval. In its final contribution on this issue in 
December 2002, Ireland reiterated its understanding of resolution 1441, noting especially 
that a ‘material breach’ of the resolution required not just a false declaration by Iraq, but also 
non-cooperation with the weapons inspectors; that it was for the Council to decide if a 
material breach had taken place and that it was for the Council to decide on any action that 
might ensue.20 As long as Ireland was on the Security Council the government was forced to 
take decisions—very often publicly.  All of the government’s decisions and speeches that are 
publicly re-viewable, including numerous debates, were in keeping with Ireland’s public 
position of opposition to the sanctions and opposition to a unilateral attack on Iraq. 
When Ireland’s term on the Security Council ended, Irish policy on Iraq was no longer 
as explicit. Opposition within Ireland to the government’s policy on the Iraq war focused 
largely on the issue of the US military’s use of Shannon airport and Irish airspace. The 
government responded that the strongest critics of US policy within the UNSC—France and 
Germany—both continued to allow the US overflight and landing privileges. As an issue, 
therefore, the use of Shannon as a stopover point by the US military did not fully 
encapsulate Ireland’s position with regard to the war. After leaving the Security Council the 
Irish government, unlike France and Germany, took a muted and more neutral stance on the 
war. This was the real shift: from the position the Irish government took during 2002 while on 
the Security Council to the view it held in 2003, when war became the clear and inevitable 
US policy. On this issue there was a clear tension between Ireland’s economic interests, 
given the country’s dependence on US investment, and the more principled foreign policy 
position set out in it’s the government’s earlier statements on the issue. Once the UNSC 
term was over and there was a less immediate requirement to adopt and defend explicit 
positions, the Irish government sought to avoid an explicit policy on developments following 
from resolution 1441; and in particular appeared unwilling to publicly criticise US foreign 
policy, while continuing to emphasise the importance of Irish–US economic links. 
 
Palestine–Israel 
Ireland has tended in its foreign policy to express sympathy with the plight of the Palestinian 
people and to support political moves towards a settlement that recognises a Palestinian 
state. The US, though still clearly Israel’s strongest ally, has become more wary of using its 
Security Council veto to block resolutions that are critical of Israel, because it is more 
conscious of the negative impact such vetoes have in the Arab world and internationally. The 
US does, however, work extremely hard in private seeking to avoid such resolutions or trying 
to ensure that they do not get broad support.  In the Security Council term before Ireland’s 
membership, for example, a Palestinian-promoted motion proposed  in December 2000 
calling for a UN Observer Force in the Occupied Territories got only eight votes, and so the 
US did not have to veto, as nine positive votes from among the 15 members are required to 
pass a resolution. 
 The changes to the Council’s membership in January 2001, and Ireland’s broad 
support for the rights of the Palestinian people and for the idea of Palestinian statehood, 
                                                 
19Details of the Irish government’s statement in relation to this resolution are available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc97.htm (1 July 2004). 
20See http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc97.htm (1 July 2004). 
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meant that a passing majority of nine votes was now more likely—potentially forcing the US 
to engage more fully. Nonetheless, throughout 2001 the US continued to oppose resolutions 
critical of Israel; but the deteriorating situation on the ground and the presence of a majority 
of nine on the Council prepared to criticise Israel pressurised the US to moderate its position 
somewhat during 2002. 
The Council returned to a discussion on Palestine in March 2001. In the first of nine 
national statements over the course of the two-year term, Ireland presented its position on 
the Council.  Ireland’s statements with regard to the Palestinian issue21 stressed 5 key 
themes: firstly the right of the Security Council to concern itself with the Middle East; 
secondly, Israel’s right to security within recognised borders; thirdly, the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people; fourthly, condemnation of terrorism, the counter-productive nature of 
Palestinian violence, Israel’s excessive reaction to such violence and illegal Israeli 
settlements; and finally Israel’s right to defend itself along with its obligation to do so in 
accordance with international humanitarian law. Ireland, along with other EU members and 
Norway, abstained on the draft resolution placed before the March meeting, which sought to 
deploy UN observers in the occupied Palestinian territories without Israeli agreement. Ireland 
believed that no state would deploy troops in such circumstances and felt that further 
consultations were needed on the core issues around the collapsed peace process. The 
resolution nonetheless got the nine positive votes necessary for passage but was vetoed by 
the US. There was little agreement on the issue among the European countries on the 
Council after this time, with Britain and Norway unwilling to vote for any resolution opposed 
by the US whereas Ireland and France were predisposed to support drafts from the Arab 
Group within the UN as long as these drafts  had sufficient balance in the text. 
The breakdown of the Oslo peace process prompted Secretary-General Annan to 
appoint as Special UN Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Terje Roed-Larson, 
the Norwegian diplomat who had facilitated the original Oslo talks. The Security Council did 
not intervene directly during this time, in order to allow Annan and Larson develop the UN’s 
role within the Quartet22 without a major clash with the US and Israel. In late 2001 the crisis 
on the ground in Israel and the institutionalisation of the Quartet permitted the Council to re-
assert itself on the issue. The re-occupation by Israel of Palestinian towns and the extra-
judicial killings carried out in October 2001 by the Israeli Defence Forces was discussed 
informally. The US strongly opposed the holding of a public session and the Palestinians, in 
the heightened post-11 September atmosphere, decided not to push the issue. The 
worsening situation on the ground led to further informal consultations. On October 25 a joint 
statement by the four envoys—of the US, UN, EU and Russia—was endorsed by the 
Security Council in a media statement drafted by Ireland, who held the presidency of the 
Council in that month. While this represented a Council endorsement of sorts of the Quartet 
approach, the US  refused to consider a resolution and the Palestinians, acting through 
Tunisia, refused to accept a presidential statement as a sufficient alternative. 
Ireland’s support for Palestinian statehood was demonstrated most clearly in 
December 2001 when Ireland’s support for a draft resolution promoted by the Arab states 
encouraged three other non-permanent Council members to vote in favour, seeing Ireland’s 
lead as giving them diplomatic cover, despite a certain US veto (and obvious British 
displeasure).23 The vetoing of this draft resolution and a recognition that there was now a 
majority on the Council in favour of moderate motions critical of Israel were important factors 
in pressurising the US towards supporting the principle of Palestinian statehood. In March 
2002, faced with a moderate Arab resolution that it would again have had to veto to defeat, 
the US introduced its own draft, which endorsed the principle of Palestinian statehood and 
                                                 
21For details see, for example, statements and vetoed resolution on 15 and 27 March. 2001, 
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (1 July 2004). 
22This is the informal group composed of the USA, the EU, the United Nations and Russia, 
which is seeking to co-ordinate international responses to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
23See Security Council report for 14 December 2001, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
(1 July 2004).  
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welcomed the involvement of the Quartet as a mediating group in the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict.24 The US also introduced its own draft of proposed resolutions dealing with the 
conflict on three occasions in late March/April 2002:calling for an Israeli withdrawal from 
Palestinian cities and welcoming Secretary-General Annan’s initiative to send a fact-finding 
mission to Jenin to investigate claims of an Israeli massacre of civilians in that city.25 
Thereafter, however, the US shifted back to a position of uncritical support of Israel and 
managed largely to keep the issue off the Council’s agenda; publicly, it argued that it took 
this approach to allow the Quartet time to get agreement on a roadmap’ for resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In late 2002, however, following the killing of UN employees by 
Israeli forces, the US was unable to avoid having to deal with a resolution in the Security 
Council and vetoed a draft resolution, one that had been supported by Ireland.26
 
Afghanistan 
Ireland held the presidency of the Security Council when the US began military action in 
Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Despite the widespread sympathy for the US following the 
previous month’s attacks in New York and Washington, DC, America initially had not wanted 
to involve the UNSC in its response to those attacks, except to write a letter saying it had 
taken its action in line with article 51 of the UN Charter, which deals with the issue of the 
self-defence of member states.  Ireland, in consort with Secretary-General Annan, 
persuaded the US and Britain to come into the Security Council the following day and brief 
the members on the actions underway in Afghanistan. This involvement created a better 
atmosphere for getting the work of the ‘Counter-Terrorism Committee’2 underway and, 
ultimately, for the establishment with UNSC approval of the International Security Assistance 
Force in Kabul (ISAF). Though it may not have chosen the UN route without Irish pressure, 
the US ultimately found the Council very supportive of its position on Afghanistan.  
Given the rapid collapse of the Taliban forces, there was limited opportunity for the 
Council to intervene during the conflict phase in Afghanistan. However, there were regular 
Council discussions, especially on post-Taliban reconstruction of the country. Ireland’s 
contributions almost always highlighted the humanitarian situation. Ireland argued against 
the view that political stability in Afghanistan would be threatened if the new Transitional 
Authority was held too tightly accountable on human-rights issues.27 In this regard Ireland 
organised and chaired two informal meetings in October 2002 between Council members 
and two Human Rights Rapporteurs who had recently undertaken official missions in 
Afghanistan—the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan, Mr. Kamal Hossain 
of Bangladesh, and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions Ms. Asma Jahangir of Pakistan, . 
 
Southern Lebanon/UNIFIL 
Following Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000, Secretary-General 
Annan had proposed that UNIFIL would become an observer mission. Even in that capacity 
it would still need considerable military support, but an ultimate phased reduction in mission 
strength from 5,851 to around 2,000 personnel was envisaged. This was ultimately approved 
in resolution 1337, which was passed on 30 January 2001. Tensions in the area slowed the 
downsizing of the force, but a reduction in the troop level to 2,700 was nevertheless 
                                                 
24Ultimately, resolution 1397, based on the US draft, was adopted on 12 March 2002. 
25Resolutions 1402, 1403 and 1405, adopted on 29 March, 9 April and 19 April, respectively. 
26See Security Council reports for 20 December 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
(1 July 2004). 
2 This committee was established under UNSC resolution 1373 on 28 September. 2001. The 
committee is made up of all UNSC members and monitors the implementation of resolution 1373. 
Further information available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ (1 October 2004). 
27Details of Ireland’s position on this matter are available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc77.htm (1 July 2004). 
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achieved by December 2002. In this context the Irish government decided to end Ireland’s 
24-year battalion-strength participation in UNIFIL in November 2001. In addition to dealing 
with UNIFIL, there were limited exchanges at the Security Council about the disputed Shab’a 
Farms area.  Lebanon, supported by Syria, claimed that this area was part of Lebanon and 
that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was therefore incomplete. The Secretary-General 
and all Council members (including Ireland) except Syria took the view that this area had 
long since been regarded as part of occupied Syria, and that the dispute remained to be 
resolved in that context rather than as part of Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon.  
 
Western Sahara 
By 2001 there was widespread acceptance that the 1991 UN plan for a referendum in 
Western Sahara on its constitutional future was unimplementable; due to differences 
between the occupying power, Morocco, which claimed sovereignty over Western Sahara, 
and the nationalist movement, Polisario. In light of this, former US secretary of state James 
Baker, acting as the personal envoy of UN secretary-general Annan, had produced a ‘Draft 
Framework Agreement’ that involved the appointment of a five-year, interim government to 
be followed by a referendum in which every person resident in the territory for at least one 
year prior to the referendum could vote. The Moroccan government had ‘encouraged’ 
Moroccan migration into Western Sahara for many years and the inclusion of these migrants 
on the voters list would have almost certainly led to the integration of Western Sahara with 
Morocco. The US and France strongly supported Baker’s proposal. Polisario opposed this 
plan and instead promoted the 1991 UN plan for self-determination.  
Ireland took a strong position of principle on this issue and was an important actor in 
the group that prevented the Baker plan from getting a majority on the Council. Ireland 
supported the right of the Sahroaui people to self-determination—as enshrined in the UN’s 
proposed Settlement Plan—and the right to exercise self-determination in a free and fair 
way. Ireland did not oppose the adoption of other political solutions apart from independent 
statehood, but only if that was the free choice of the Sahroaui people themselves. 
At first glance, the composition of the Security Council in 2002 would seem to offer 
Morocco the potential support of nine votes (ultimately including the US, France and Britain) 
in favour of a new resolution that would have been much more supportive of its position than 
the 1991 Settlement Plan had been. If that had been the case, China and Russia—traditional 
supporters of Polisario during the Cold War—might have decided not to use their veto. As it 
happened, however, Ireland was quite active and vocal on the issue, especially among the 
ten elected members of the Council. Ireland’s activity ensured that Baker’s Draft Framework 
never had more than six or seven supporters. The Council ultimately adopted resolution 
1429, on 30 July 2002, effectively putting off a decision on the Western Sahara issue for six 
months. Ireland’s role in preventing the Council from adopting Baker’s Framework 
Agreement was widely recognised in New York and was welcomed by Polisario. Morocco, 
however, was angered by the Irish position; having lined up Baker, the USA, France and 
Britain to support its position it assumed the Security Council would follow. 
By way of a postscript, when Ireland left the council on 31 December 2002 some Irish 
officials feared that the new Council would abandon support for Sahroaui self-
determination.29 However, James Baker had lost the initiative for his Framework Agreement 
and presented a new plan in May 2003, which was much more acceptable to Polisario but 
which was then opposed by Morocco. Baker resigned as Special Envoy on 11 June 2004 
with little progress having been made. 
 
                                                 
29Private information provided to the author. 
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Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the Security Council responded 
immediately by describing the attacks as a ‘threat to international peace and security’—this 
marked the first time the Council used such language in response to attacks by non-state 
actors of this type.30 The Council subsequently adopted resolution 1373, which required all 
UN members to implement comprehensive ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation.31 The Council also 
agreed to set up a special implementation committee—called the ‘Counter-Terrorism 
Committee’. This was established during Ireland’s presidency of the Council, and so it fell to 
Ireland to get agreement on the modalities for the committee.32 The arrangements were 
made following a series of bi-laterals between Ireland and every other Council member and 
informal consultations with the full Council. This was a departure from previous practice, 
whereby such consultations would have involved only the Permanent Five members of the 
Council and the elected members would  have been served with an agreed position in an 
effective ‘take it or leave it’. Also, in a somewhat unusual move, the arrangements on the 
modalities for the committee were put in place following a written exchange of 
correspondence between Ireland as president of the Council and the British chair of the 
committee, Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock. This had the effect of asserting that the full 
Council approved (and therefore controlled) the initial work programme of the committee. 
The committee’s first task was to deal with the reports requested from all UN member 
states under resolution 1373. It appointed a number of experts to assist it, primarily in the 
spheres of financial law and practice and legislative drafting. It decided, however, not to 
recruit an expert on human rights and counter-terrorism. The proposal to recruit such an 
expert was directly opposed by China and Russia and it was not actively supported by the 
other permanent Council members—the US, Britain and France. Ireland, with support from 
Norway, Mauritius and Mexico, pressed the need for a human-rights focus in the 
committee’s work and was commended by human-rights NGOs in this regard. The 
relationship between counter-terror measures and human rights remains contentious, 
however. In November 2002 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to analyse the effects of ‘counter-terrorism’ measures: 
a similar initiative by Mexico had failed in April 2002 at the UN Human Rights Commission 
for lack of support.33  
The wider political context was well illustrated during Ireland’s last month on the 
council. Following bomb attacks in Kenya on 28 November, in which Kenyan and Israeli 
citizens died, and an attempted missile attack on the same day on an Israeli plane, the US 
introduced in the Council a draft resolution that contained several references to Israel. A 
number of countries thought this was an unfortunate attempt to use the relative consensus 
on the Council regarding the Counter-Terrorism Committee to promote America’s 
perspective on the Middle East. Ultimately, the US withdrew most of the references apart 
from an expression of ‘sympathy and condolences to the people and the Governments of 
Kenya and Israel and to the victims of the terrorist attack and their families’. This was 
sufficient to get the support of all Council members other than Syria.34
 
                                                 
30Resolution 1368, approved by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (15 June 2004). 
31This resolution was adopted on 28 September 2001, text available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (15 June 2004). 
32See note by the president of Security Council 4 October 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/2001/prst2001.htm. 
33Amnesty International Report 2003, ‘2002 in focus: “Counter-terrorism” and human rights’, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/focus2002_1-eng (15 June 2004). 
34See debate on resolution 1450, 13 December 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
(15 June 2004). 
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Sanctions Regimes 
The 1990s (and the immediate post-Cold War era) saw a major increase in the ability of the 
Council to agree on sanctions regimes.  In the late-Cold War period the only Council 
sanctions regime in operation was against apartheid South Africa.  By 2001 there were ten 
sanctions regimes. The practice has developed whereby each regime is overseen by a 
committee consisting of all Council members, and each is chaired by the permanent 
representative of one of the ten elected Council members, acting in a personal as opposed 
to a national capacity. Ireland’s permanent representative, Ambassador Richard Ryan, took 
the chair of the Angola (UNITA) sanctions regime, a regime that was wound up in late 2002. 
The Angolan situation is discussed more fully below. 
In addition to expressing its position on each individual regime, Ireland articulated the 
following policy on sanctions regimes in general. Firstly, sanctions should be narrowly 
targeted on the parties to be coerced. The Council has a particular responsibility to mitigate 
the impact of sanction on civilians to the point of elimination of adverse humanitarian 
consequences. Secondly, sanctions should be time-limited and should require a further 
decision of the Council to extend them beyond their original time frame. This position was 
very pertinent in the context of the on-going sanctions regime against Iraq: the fact that it 
would have required a specific decision to end them in effect allowed the US or Britain to 
extend them indefinitely. Thirdly, sanction should be linked upon adoption to specific 
objectives and the Council should invariably lift/suspend the sanctions if those specific 
objectives are met. Again this position was clearly evident in the context of the Iraq sanctions 
debates. Finally, Ireland argued that there needed to be transparent procedures for adopting 
sanctions that respect the human, civil and other rights of people to be included under 
sanctions regimes, even taking account of the sensitive nature of the information and 
intelligence involved in such discussions. 
This latter issue came to a head in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. In a series of resolutions between 1999 and early 2001, the UNSC had imposed 
sanctions on members of al-Qaeda and of the Taliban regime, including a travel ban and the 
freezing of assets.36 In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, at the request of the US, 
a large number of individuals and organisations were added to the list of those covered by 
these sanctions. Sweden in particular (following the inclusion of some Swedish citizens 
under these sanctions) opposed the policy of adding individuals to the list without evidence 
or proper procedures. The US and Britain argued strongly against an evidence-based 
system of extending these sanctions, on the grounds it would compromise intelligence 
sources. Ireland, though broadly supportive f America’s ‘counter-terrorism’ agenda on the 
Council, supported the position that some more rigorous procedure was required to impose 
sanctions. Ultimately, a set of compromise procedures was adopted in November 2002. In a 
follow-up to these discussions, the Council adopted resolution 1452 on 20 December 2002, 
which provided for certain humanitarian exemptions under the 1267 sanctions regime 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Prior to Ireland’s election to the Council, a working group had been established, 
chaired by Ambassador  Anwarul Karim Chowdhury of Bangladesh, that was charged with 
making recommendation for the improved design and implementation of sanctions. The 
working group’s report was presented to the Council on 14 February 20013. One of the key 
points made in the report was that the Council should commit itself to fixed time limits for all 
sanctions regimes. However, in the context of the debate on the sanctions against Iraq, the 
US refused to accept this principle; and attempts by Ireland during its presidency of the 
Security Council in October 2001 failed to find a compromise. In practice, however, new 
                                                 
36Details of these sanctions can be found in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1363 
(2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (1 July 2004). 
3 Seethe text of the report available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/514/79/PDF/N0151479.pdf?OpenElement (1 October 2004) 
and statements on the report available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7183.doc.htm (1 October 2004). 
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sanctions regimes established during 2001–2—that is, those dealing with Liberia and Sierra 
Leone and the new sanctions regime on al-Qaeda and the Taliban—did have set time limits 
or review periods –.37 However this approach was never adopted as a comprehensive 
statement of Council policy because of US opposition. 
 
Angola 
The chairing of the Angola sanctions committee by Ambassador Richard Ryan coincided 
with one of the most dramatic advances in Security Council policy. The UNITA rebel group 
had fought against the Angola government since the 1970s and had been backed during the 
Cold War by the US and apartheid South Africa. In the aftermath of UNITA’s rejection of a 
UN-brokered peace plan, the Security Council had imposed sanctions on UNITA in 1997: the 
sale of weapons and fuel to UNITA and the purchase of Angolan diamonds were banned. 
The sanctions were, however, widely flouted. In 1999 the Canadian permanent 
representative, Ambassador Robert R. Fowler, took over the chair of the Angola sanctions 
committee and adopted a very pro-active approach that involved ‘naming and shaming’ 
organisations and individuals who broke the sanctions regime. By January 2001, when 
Ambassador Ryan of Ireland took the chair, the sanctions were beginning to seriously impact 
on UNITA’s ability to prolong the war.  
Ambassador Ryan visited Angola and its neighbours in March and April 2001, to 
reassure the Angolan government that his chairing of the sanctions committee would not 
lead to any relaxation in the regime, and to impress upon neighbouring governments that 
any renewed trafficking would lead to their public condemnation by the Security Council. He 
also visited a number of Eastern European states in June 2001 who had been exposed as 
arms suppliers to UNITA during the 1990s. In September 2001 the Angolan sanctions 
committee agreed an extended list of UNITA officials and family members who were to face 
travel restrictions, thereby limiting UNITA’s propaganda activities and its attempts at 
securing international financing. The committee also secured the freezing by various national 
authorities of a number of bank accounts linked to UNITA. 
Concerns were expressed by some Council members about the quality of 
governance within the Angolan government, for example, the IMF estimated that 20 per cent 
of oil revenues were missing from the national accounts, and this money was desperately 
needed to fund humanitarian activities. However, this concern never featured in the public 
comments of the Council. Angola’s oil and diamond industries gave it considerable leverage 
over powerful states and it had strong commercial relationships with the US, Russia, Britain, 
France and Norway in particular. Ireland and Britain did argue for the Angolan government’s 
own resources to be more fully used for humanitarian purposes, but governance issues were 
left unmentioned in any Council statements or resolutions. 
Starved of resources UNITA began to lose the civil war, and the rebel leadership was 
eventually surrounded. When UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed by the Angolan army 
in February 2002 most of the remainder of the leadership lost the will to continue. A 
ceasefire was signed on 4 April, and in November the government and UNITA reached a 
broader political agreement and jointly called for the lifting of sanctions. In resolution 1448 on 
9 December 2002, the Council ended the sanctions regime against Angola and wound up 
the sanctions committee with immediate effect. 
 
The Balkans 
Ireland’s period on the Security Council coincided with a normalisation of relations between 
the UN and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including the ending of sanctions that 
had been imposed under resolution 1160, on 31 March 1998. 
 
                                                 
37Resolution 1390 on al-Qaeda; 1408 on Liberia; 1446 on Sierra Leone. 
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Presevo Valley: The beginning of 2001 saw ethnic Albanian armed groups engaged 
in attacks against Serb civilians and FRY troops in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia. 
The extent to which the FRY’s relations with the UN had improved was demonstrated when 
the Council called on NATO to relax its Ground Safety Zone, which had been imposed after 
the NATO bombing of the region in 1999 to keep the FRY army back from the border with 
Kosovo. This allowed the FRY, with UN and NATO blessing, to confront armed Albanian 
groups, effectively ending their campaign. As a balancing measure, the Council also 
supported moves by Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic of Serbia to negotiate with the 
Albanian community. 
 
FYROM: In March 2001 tensions erupted between Slavs and ethnic Albanians in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), in the region of the border with Kosovo. 
The UN conflict prevention mission (UNPREDEP) had been withdraw in March 1999 when 
China vetoed its renewal following FYROM’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. Despite this background, on 21 March 2001 the Council, with Chinese support, 
passed resolution 1345, which stressed support for FYROM’s majority Slav government 
while stressing the need for dialogue between the ethnic communities. Following an upsurge 
in violence in the republic, the Security Council returned to debating the conflict in June. 
NATO, at the invitation of the FYROM government, was intending to deploy a mission to 
oversee weapons disposal as part of the recent Framework Agreement that had been 
brokered, by the Special Envoys of the EU and the US, between the communities. The 
Framework Agreement, signed on 13 August 2001, set out a complex agenda including a 
ceasefire, disarmament and disbandment of the ethnic Albanian armed groups and a series 
of internal reforms aimed at meeting the demands of the minority Albanian community for 
autonomy and greater equality in public life.4 Ireland argued that the force being deployed 
should have a UN mandate, even though non-NATO countries would not deploy troops. This 
position was shared by Germany and to a lesser extent France and Russia. The US and 
Britain insisted on NATO’s right to act independently and initially refused to support any 
resolution that went further than offering ‘support’ for the mission. Ultimately, resolution 
1371, which was approved on 26 June 2001, went somewhat further in that it incorporated a 
compromise supported by Ireland: the text of the resolution included the words ‘endorse’ and 
‘strongly support’, thereby at least implying that the UN Security Council was the body 
competent to make decisions about deploying such missions. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was 
discussed every three months at Council level. In mid 2001 the Secretary-General advised 
that mission’s mandate had been successfully completed and recommended that UNMIBH 
be withdrawn by the end of 2002. The main component of UNMIBH was the International 
Police Task Force (IPTF), which was responsible for police training and oversight.40 
Following discussions between the U and the UN, the EU decided to take over these policing 
responsibilities. This marked the steady increase of EU responsibility in the region and the 
decline of UN interest in Bosnia, in line with President Bush’s stated objectives. The EU 
police mission took over responsibility and UNMIBH was fully withdrawn on 31 December 
2002. 
 
Kosovo: Kosovo was discussed at monthly public meetings of the Council during 
2001–2 and was the subject of many informal consultations, normally at the instigation of 
Russia. The final status of Kosovo was dominant in almost all discussions. A Security 
Council mission, which included Ireland, travelled to the region, in June 2001, following the 
adoption of the UN brokered Constitutional Framework for provisional self-government in 
                                                 
4 Further details and full text are available at http://www.bndlg.de/~wplarre/back010814.htm (1 
October 2004). 
40Details of the mission and its mandate are available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/mandate.html (1 July 2004). 
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May5. On this mission, Ireland explicitly compared the situation in Kosovo with regard to the 
Constitutional Framework to that in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). 
Ireland argued that both the GFA and the Constitutional Framework provided for multi-ethnic 
structures and cross-community power-sharing, without prejudicing the eventual and final 
constitutional status of the region in question. Ireland was also extremely active on the 
question of ethnic Albanian political prisoners, many of who had been detained in Serbia for 
long periods. Ireland raised this issue at every meeting on Kosovo and was often the only 
country to do so.6 Ireland’s activism on the Council on this issue was acknowledged by both 
the UN Secretariat and NGOs when the prisoners were finally released in early 2002. 
The gradual establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
occurred during 2002 in Kosovo, but that year was also noteworthy for the gradual shift in 
the US position from one of outright support for ethnic Albanians, which it had held since the 
build up to the 1999 bombing of the region, towards the more balanced EU position. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  
Irish diplomats  saw their role on the Council with regard to the DRC as being to seek to 
balance the alternative perspectives of France (which tended to support the DRC 
government in Kinshasa) and Britain (which tended to support Uganda and Rwanda).7 There 
was a gradual evolution of the US position during Ireland’s term. The new Bush 
administration did not carry the same sensitivities regarding the Council’s failures to 
intervene during the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the practical result of this was that the 
administration was not as supportive of the British position. The situation on the ground was 
incredibly difficult. It is estimated that between 2 million and 3 million civilians died in the 
DRC between 1998 and 2002, in fighting between the Congolese military and Ugandan- and 
Rwandan-backed rebels, with the result of the conflict being the de-facto partitioning of the 
country: the DRC government retained control only in the south-west; Ugandan-backed 
rebels held sway in the north-west and Rwandan backed forces controlled the north-east. 
Following the death of DRC president Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and given the 
increased dialogue that ensued between the new DRC government and the rebels, the UN 
saw an opportunity to deploy its peace mission in the country (known as MONUC) more fully 
to monitor a three pronged peace process—foreign troop withdrawals, inter-Congolese 
dialogue; and disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (or 
DDRRR ).41 France and Russia sought to prioritise the withdrawal of foreign troops and to 
de-link the three elements of the process—effectively supporting the DRC government’s 
position. The British and the Americans were somewhat muted in their reaction , leading to 
some speculation among others on the Security Council that this was linked to France’s 
recent softening of its opposition  to the US/British call for sanctions in Liberia. Ireland 
argued that if there was not progress on all three issues—troop withdrawals, dialogue and 
DDRRR—there would be no progress at all. 
                                                 
5 Full text of the Constitutional Framework is available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (1 October 2004). 
6 See records of meetings at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm  
7 While some of these alliances were long standing, the conflict essentially resulted from the 
genocide in Rwanda and then developed its own DRC-based dynamic. Britain had close relations with 
its former colony Uganda, and when the then Ugandan-backed (and generally English-speaking) 
Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Rwanda after the genocide Britain  developed close links with 
Rwanda. France, on the other hand, had better relations with the French-speaking government in 
DRC. France also lost a francophone ally of sorts when the Hutu regime collapsed in Rwanda, and as 
the new government accused the French of supporting the old regime relations were poor. When the 
leaders of old Hutu regime who had organised the genocide fled into DRC they were pursued by 
Rwanda and its then Ugandan allies, who formed alliances mainly based on ethnic-kin groups. Later, 
tensions between Uganda and Rwanda ended their military alliances. 
41There were two Irish Army officers involved with MONUC as observers at this time. 
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The outbreak of violence in June 2002 in Kisangani, a city held by the then 
Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) ,increased the pressure on the 
Security Council to press for a power-sharing government for the DRC that would be 
inclusive of all the main factions. Following the deaths of nearly 200 people in Kisangani, the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, addressed the Council in 
private—in ‘informal consultation of the whole’8. This briefing was held following pressure 
from Ireland, and was the first time such a briefing ever happened on a specific country 
situation. 
Agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and between the DRC and Uganda 
followed in July and September 2002, leading to significant progress on the issue of the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. The UN Secretary-General then sought an increase in the size 
of MONUC to 8,700 personnel and a strengthened mandate for the mission. This was 
supported by all council members (including Ireland), except the US, which eventually 
agreed to support what became resolution 1445 on 4 December. Approval of this resolution 
in the Council was followed by an internal Congolese agreement on comprehensive power-
sharing on 17 December. However, even then it was obvious that implementation would not 
be unproblematic. 
 
Burundi 
The installation of a transitional power-sharing government in Burundi on 1 November 2001 
increased hopes for an eventual ceasefire in the country’s on-going civil war. Ireland was 
among a number of UNSC members who took the view that President Pierre Buyoya, a 
member of the minority Tutsi community that has dominated Burundi’s government, army 
and economy since independence, was obstructing the implementation of the peace 
process. In particular, more rapid progress was required on involving the majority Hutu 
community in government and on establishing an all-Burundi ‘Special Protection Unit’. The 
purpose of this unit was to take over from a transitional South African unit that had been 
protecting Hutu politicians returning from exile against threats from the Tutsi-dominated 
security forces. In a series of informal Council consultations in late 2001, Ireland pressed for 
a public statement critical of President Buyoya, but France consistently opposed any such 
statement. Some progress  was made in Burundi during 2002, and a series of ceasefire 
agreements between most of the rebel groups was signed in October and December. Also in 
December, the Council adopted a presidential statement calling on the UN to look at how it 
might offer assistance to Burundi in the implementation of the peace agreements.9
 
                                                 
8This is a UN procedure, whereby an informal ‘gathering’ of the full Council is held, in private, 
without constituting a formal meeting and thereby invoking Council procedures including a written 
record. Further information is available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/informal/summary.htm 
(2 October 2004). 
9Details of this presidential statement, which was adopted on 18 December 2002,are 
available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/748/02/PDF/N0274802.pdf?OpenElement 
(3 October 2004). 
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Liberia 
In January 2001 as Ireland joined the UNSC, the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts10 Report 
was being discussed. This report clearly demonstrated that Liberia was supplying arms to 
the notorious Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group in Sierra Leone that came to 
international prominence for its systematic amputation of the limbs of civilians and for its part 
in a war financed by ‘blood diamonds’. At a Council meeting on 25 January Ireland 
condemned Liberia’s support for the RUF, and it took the same approach in subsequent 
discussions on a US–British draft resolution that included a new sanctions regime for Liberia. 
Resolution 1343, which was passed on 7 March 2001, continued a long standing arms 
embargo on the country , added a ban on rough diamond imports from Liberia and banned 
foreign travel by named senior government figures. In further public Council meetings, 
Ireland supported the continuation of sanctions but also (successfully) called for the 
humanitarian consequences of proposed additional sanctions measures to be examined 
before they were introduced. Intensified fighting in Liberia during 2002 between the 
government and the rebel group known as Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) led to renewed efforts in the Council to resolve the conflict and promote 
national reconciliation. Liberia meanwhile accused its neighbour Guinea of supporting the 
LURD by means of the provision of arms and materiel—a claim broadly supported by the 
Panel of Experts. Britain and the US, however resisted attempts by Ireland and others to 
have negative references to LURD included in Council statements.43 This led to suspicions 
among other Council members that the US and Britain were favourably disposed towards 
any Guinean attempt to overthrow Liberian president Charles Taylor. Discussion of Guinea’s 
role in Liberia was also made problematic by Guinea’s election to the Security Council from 
1 January 2002.  
As a postscript to Ireland’s Security Council role regarding Liberia, a peace 
agreement in August 2003 and the voluntary exile of President Charles Taylor to Nigeria led 
to the deployment in Liberia of a UN force (UNMIL) that included 450 Irish troops and to the 
provision of a post-conflict aid programme of approximately €7.5m over three years, from 
Ireland’s development cooperation budget.44  
 
Sierra Leone  
Ireland’s UNSC term saw a number of significant developments in Sierra Leone. The Council 
passed resolution 134645 in March of 2001, increasing the size of the UN peacekeeping 
mission (UNAMSIL)46 established in 1999 and condemning the RUF. A peace agreement 
between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in May 2001 saw peaceful 
presidential and parliamentary elections proceed in May 2002, with the participation of 
candidates from the RUF. The UNAMSIL mission was one of the largest in UN history, 
involving 17,500 troops, and was ultimately seen to have played a positive role in the 
                                                 
10 This panel was appointed under resolution 1306, adopted by the Security Council 
on 5 July 2000. Its role was to investigate breaches of an earlier Council sanctions 
resolution (resolution 1171 of 1998). The panel appointed by Kofi Annan was made 
up of Martin Chungong Ayafor (Cameroon), as chair; Ian Smillie ((Canada), diamond 
expert); Johan Peleman ((Belgium), expert on arms and transportation); Harjit Singh 
Sandhu ((India), expert from Interpol); and Atabou Bodian ((Senegal), expert from the 
International Civil Aviation Organization). 
43Details available at http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc50.htm (25 June 2004). 
44For details see http://www.dci.gov.ie/liberia.asp and 
http://www.military.ie/overseas/africa.htm (25 June 2004). 
45The text of the resolution is available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/312/19/PDF/N0131219.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 12 May 2004). 
46Details of the mission are available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/ (12 
May 2004). 
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country. The main debate in the Council during 2002 was on how it would be downsized 
before its eventual disbanding. The US and Britain sought a relatively quick downsizing. The 
Special Representative of the Secretary General, Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria, in discussions 
with the Irish mission asked for sufficient time to allow the sensitisation of the population and 
for various operational requirements to be fulfilled before UNAMSIL would be disbanded. 
Ireland supported this position in a contribution to the Council and this approach was 
ultimately accepted in resolution 1436, on 24 September 2002, which sets out the stages for 
the withdrawal of UNAMSIL and includes a number of benchmarks to be met, including 
consideration of the situation in Liberia. 
 
Somalia 
In the years following the withdrawal of the UN mission in Somalia in 1995 there was little 
appetite among either UNSC members or the UN Secretariat to re-visit the situation in that 
country. The US, understandably, given its experience in 1993 when a decision was taken to 
withdraw from the UN mission after a number of US soldiers were captured and killed, was 
particularly cautious. Ireland and Norway were active in seeking to raise the UN’s profile in 
Somalia. As a result of Irish and Norwegian pressure and in the face of opposition from the 
US, Britain and the Secretariat a number of initiatives were taken. The Council sought to 
strengthen the moribund arms embargo by appointing a Panel of Experts to report in 
February 2003. During Ireland presidency of the council in October 2001 Ireland led 
negotiations on a presidential statement,47 which called on the UN Secretariat to work to 
create conditions for a peace-building mission to Somalia. The Secretary-General was 
mandated to report to the Council every four months, a fact that in itself raised Somalia’s 
profile to a higher level. British sympathy for the secession of Somaliland became more 
pronounced during Ireland’s term on the Council, but this was counterbalanced by support 
for the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia by, amongst others, Russia, France, China 
and Ireland. After the 11 September attacks there were some initial signs of concern by the 
US that Somalia might be a haven for terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda. However, as 
US fears in this regard dissipated fairly quickly during 2002 there was no change in the US 
reluctance to become involved in the country in any way. Despite the efforts of Ireland and 
Norway, there was no sign that the UN was any more likely to take a new initiative on 
Somalia at the end of Ireland’s term than there had been at the beginning, and the 
reluctance of the Secretariat, Britain and the US to make any moves in this regard was as 
great as ever. 
 
Cyprus 
Following Secretary-General Annan’s invitation to the leaders of the Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriot communities to engage in proximity talks in Geneva in January 2001, the Council 
received regular briefings from the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus, Alvaro 
de Soto. Even though the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash was generally held to be 
more responsible for the stalemate that stalled the talks, the Council did not intervene to lay 
blame. Non-aligned members of the Council sought to use their forum to support the Greek-
Cypriot position. Ireland, however did not support these moves not least in an effort to avoid 
a Turkish-Cypriot walkout from the talks. While further significant progress did not take place 
until after Ireland left the Council, there was widespread optimism among Council members 
in late 2002 that the victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey’s general 
election would create a new dynamic for change. 
 
                                                 
47This statement was ultimately released as 2001/30. 
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East Timor / Timor Leste 
Ireland had taken a high profile stance on the issue of East Timor right through the 1990s—
as exemplified by the work of Tom Hyland and the Irish East Timor Solidarity Group and by 
the efforts of then Minister for Foreign Affairs, David Andrews. It was not surprising that the 
government was keen to continue its interest in the country during its term as a UNSC 
member. As the situation on the ground in East Timor was hugely improved in 2001 from the 
crisis that had existed in 1999, there was some pressure to reduce the size of the UN 
presence there. Ireland and Singapore were the strongest voices on the Council for a 
significant continuing UN presence in post-independence East Timor. The delegation in New 
York had planned for a major presidential statement during the Irish presidency of the 
Council in October 2001. This statement was subsequently adopted on 31 October in a 
public session chaired by Minister Brian Cowen and attended by Mari Alkatiri, First Minister 
of the Transitional Government of East Timor, and by the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was later tragically killed in the attack on the UN 
offices in Iraq in August 2003.11 This statement supported the Secretary-General, who 
wished the UN to remain engaged in East Timor at a significant level. 
When the Secretary-General published his proposals for a post-independence  
presence after 20 May 2002 (independence day), it was warmly welcomed by those states, 
including Ireland, that had argued for a cautious withdrawal and continuing post-
independence support. Some of the larger Council members in particular thought that the 
financial commitment proposed by the Secretary-General was too much. However, none 
was willing to express this in public and the Council established the UN Mission of Support in 
East Timor on 17 May 2002.48
 
Thematic Debates 
In addition to geographically defined issues, the UNSC occasionally has meetings on 
thematic issues such as ‘women and peace and security’, ‘small arms’, ‘conflict prevention’, 
etc.   Some of these debates are ‘showpiece debates’ chosen by the delegation holding the 
presidency for a given month and primarily for a domestic audience in their home country. 
The debates are often highly routine and rarely productive. The Irish UN mission decided not 
to hold any such a debate,  as their Presidency in October 2001 occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks when the Council was extremely busy.  
A second and quite different set of thematic meetings  are  based on periodic reports 
from the secretary general on substantive issues. While no such report arose during 
Ireland’s Presidency there were a number during the two year term. . One of the most high 
profile and useful of these debates was that held on ‘women and security’ as a follow-up to 
resolution 1325, which had sought to address the particular effects of conflict on women and 
girls and the particular contribution of women to conflict resolution.49 Resolution 1325 had 
called for a study and a report from the Secretary-General but did not indicate a timescale 
for the completion of either of these tasks. When it became clear that a report would not be 
ready for the first anniversary of the adoption of the resolution, Ireland was one of a group of 
Council members that encouraged the adoption of a supportive presidential Statement; such 
a statement was ultimately adopted when Brian Cowen chaired the Council on 31 October 
2001. A more substantial debate occurred a year later, when the Secretary-General’s report 
                                                 
11 For full text see  
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/614/01/PDF/N0161401.pdf?OpenElement (2 
October 2004). 
48Resolution 1410 established UNMISET. The Security Council also recommended UN 
membership for the country to the General Assembly on 23 May, and the General Assembly admitted 
Timor Leste on 26 September 2002. 
49This resolution had been adopted 31 October 2000. The text of the resolution is available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (12 May 2004). 
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on women in peace and security was discussed. The report’s central proposal was that in 
order to respond to the particular needs of women in situations of armed conflict, gender 
perspectives had to be systematically integrated into all peace-support, humanitarian and 
reconstruction projects. Ireland strongly supported the report and highlighted the 
independent study completed by the United Nations development fund for women 
(UINFEM).50 A presidential statement was subsequently adopted by the Council, affirming 
the importance of gender mainstreaming in peace-keeping and post-conflict programmes.51
Another significant set of thematic meetings were those on conflict prevention. In 
June 2001 Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his first report on conflict prevention. 
This report sought to respond to three sets of concerns expressed by the wider UN 
membership during the drafting of the report: that conflict prevention would displace 
development aid; that conflict prevention would create a culture of intervention in sovereign 
states; and that areas where the General Assembly traditionally held competence—such as 
in relation to HIV/AIDS, peace-building, etc—would be usurped by the Security Council. 
Ireland’s presentation to the open debate focused on the complementary relationship 
between conflict prevention and development, the important role that could be played in 
relation to such issues by regional organisations and the need to improve the coherence of 
and capacity for conflict prevention within the UN system.52 The problematic nature of the 
issues raised, however, made practical progress difficult and 14 drafting meetings were 
required before a follow-up resolution was ultimately agreed in August.53
 
International Criminal Court 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court(ICC), and in particular the US attitude 
to it, were discussed at Security Council level on a number of occasions during 2001 and 
2002. Ireland had signed the treaty establishing the court in 1998 and, following a 
referendum, ratified it on 11 April 2002. While US concerns about the court were known 
during the Clinton presidency, it became clear in the early days of the Bush administration 
that there would be active US opposition to he ICC. The US ‘un-signed’ the establishing 
treaty on 6 May 2002, but it failed to stop the court coming into effect on 1 July that year, 
because the treaty had already been ratified by more than the required sixty states. 
When ratification looked imminent, the US stepped up its campaign of opposition to 
the ICC. During debate on the post-independence UN presence in East Timor, discussed 
above, the US tried but failed to insert a clause into the resolution dealing with East Timor 
that would have prohibited the transfer of members of the new UN mission (UNMISET) to 
the ICC.54 In June it became clear that the US was planning to veto annual renewals of UN 
peace-keeping operations in order to pressurise the Council to agree an exemption for US 
citizens from the ICC’s mandate. Council members in both informal discussions and in public 
session55 questioned whether the UNSC had any locus standi. In effect, in order to 
intervene, the Council was declaring that the US threat to veto peace-keeping missions was 
in itself a threat to international security, which justified a ‘Chapter VII’ resolution under the 
UN Charter. The US sought to have the Council invoke article 16 of the Rome Statue (which 
                                                 
50See the report of the open meeting on 28 October 2002 and the statement available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc86.htm (12 May 2004). 
51That statement was adopted on 31 October 2002. 
52See the proceedings of the open Council meeting held on 21 June 2001, available at  
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N01/420/53/PDF/N0142053.pdf?OpenElement (12 
May 2004). 
53This became resolution 1366, passed on 30 August 2001. 
54The resolution on a post-independence presence for the UN in East Timor was ultimately 
adopted as resolution 1410 on 17 May 2002. 
55For details of these discussions see 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=4154&Cr=icc&Cr1=&Kw1=international+criminal+
court&Kw2=&Kw3 (12 May 2004). 
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established the ICC), under which the UNSC may request the deferral of an investigation or 
prosecution by the ICC for a period of up to one year. Again, many Council members argued 
that article 16 was never intended to be utilized for advance requests for immunity from 
investigation or prosecution of an entire category of people, but rather was focused on actual 
and individual cases. 
The renewal of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first to be 
affected by the US position, and only three short technical extensions of the mandate kept 
the mission in place while the crisis over the ICC was resolved.56 One resolution on UNMIBH 
was vetoed by the US during this time.57 Ultimately and controversially, resolution 1422 
agreed on 12 July 2002 effectively gave the US its exemption from the ICC’s mandate. In 
this resolution, the ouncil asked the ICC not to commence or proceed with a case against a 
person from a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute without first obtaining Security 
Council approval. This resolution differed a little from earlier US drafts in that it was not to be 
automatically extended and included the phrase ‘if a case arises’ to move it closer to the 
intent of article 16. However, it is nevertheless a decision in advance of a case and it affects 
a category of people, not an individual. At the open meeting on 10 July, Ireland had said that 
the US position was ‘not well founded’58, that Ireland could not agree to the mechanism that 
the US sought and that Ireland believed the Rome Statute contained sufficient safeguards to 
prevent ‘politically inspired’ prosecutions.59 Ireland and Mexico were the last two countries to 
agree to support the resolution, which was ultimately adopted unanimously two days later. 
While the UN resolution was condemned by human-rights groups60 the controversy did have 
the effect of raising the profile of the International Criminal Court. Resolution 1422 overcome 
the deadlock on the UNSC but it did not end US antagonism towards the court and the 
Americans followed a policy of seeking bilateral agreements with other states to avoid ICC 
prosecution for war crimes against any US citizen. 
 
 
PROCESS ISSUES 
 
Ireland and the EU 
 During Ireland's term on the Council the delegation, along with the other EU Security 
Council members, Britain and France, provided weekly briefings for all EU members, in 
implementation of Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union. At Ireland's insistence, this 
was a much more structured relationship than had previously been the case and was very 
positively received by EU partners. Germany and Spain who replaced Ireland and Norway 
on the Council both resolved to continue the process. The two EU permanent Council 
members also seem to have been persuaded of the merits of the more comprehensive 
briefing. 
Ireland, on joining the Council, placed great priority on the articulation of common EU 
positions where they existed. It has often been a source of irritation at EU level that there is 
                                                 
56These extensions were agreed in resolutions 1418, 1420 and 1421. 
57On 30 June 2002, the resolution on UNMIBH proposed by Bulgaria and supported by 
Ireland was vetoed by the US. See 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=4077&Cr=Bosnia&Cr1=&Kw1=international+crimi
nal+court&Kw2=&Kw3 (12 May 2004). 
58Details of Ireland’s contribution to the meeting are available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc82.htm (accessed 12 May 2004). 
59See http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/469/11/PDF/N0246911.pdf?OpenElement ( accessed12 May 2004). 
60For details of this criticism see, for example, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-index-eng 
and http://www.amnesty.nl/persberichten/NK-PB0088.shtml, and see 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR510062004 for objection to 2003 renewal. 
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a gap between then theory of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the position adopted 
by the two EU permanent members on the UNSC, and especially by Britain. During Ireland’s 
term this gap was clearly visible on issues such as the ICC, Iraq and occasionally the Middle 
East. The members of the Irish delegation believed that they consistently articulated EU 
common positions on the Council. However, as the above discussion on substantive issues 
shows, there were many occasions when no such common policy existed. 
 
Relations with NGOs 
The Irish delegation devoted considerable time to having a good working relationship with 
NGOs, especially with the NGO Working Group on Security Council matters. This group of 
35 includes major international NGOs such as OXFAM, Médicins Sans Frontiers and 
Amnesty International. The Irish delegation held nine separate off-the-record meetings with 
the NGO working group over the 2 years of Ireland’s membership of the UNSC, including 
two meetings in which Minister Cowen participated. The NGOs acknowledged to the Irish 
delegation that such access and structured discussion between NGOs and a Council 
member was unprecedented and was warmly welcomed. Ireland was also a supporter of 
Arria Formula meetings in advance of open Security Council discussions—especially on 
thematic issues.61 These informal discussions provide an opportunity for civil society 
organisations to make a case to the combined Council members. 
 
OTHER STRUCTURED RELATIONS  
In fulfilment of a promise made during Ireland’s campaign for UNSC membership, the Irish 
permanent representative, Ambassador Richard Ryan, organised an extensive set of 
briefings/meetings with non-Council member states. Typically these involved working 
lunches with around 15 other representatives, and each delegation had three or four such 
meetings. This type of engagement with non-Council members was unprecedented in the 
UN system and was widely welcomed. 
Ireland also sought to initiate closer cooperation between the ‘elected ten’ members 
on the Council. There was no possibility of a united bloc being formed given the diversity of 
states involved. Also, tactically the five permanent UNSC member states would have been 
likely to react defensively to such an attempt. However, Ireland did initiate monthly meetings 
of the permanent representatives of the ‘elected ten’, which has now become a reasonably 
routine practice. While the political impact of such meetings is limited, the practice did, for 
example, provide a means of exchanging information for many states with small diplomatic 
services, and it certainly played some role in maintaining a cohesive position on Western 
Sahara in the face of pressure from the permanent members. 
 
Co-operation with ECOSOC  
While the ongoing political crisis in Guinea-Bissau rarely featured in international headlines, 
its political and economic problems were the subject of a novel institutional development 
during Ireland’s Council term. The Council agreed that Guinea-Bissau was an appropriate 
area for cooperation between the Security Council and the UN Economic and Social council 
(ECOSOC). The Council established a working group on conflict prevention and resolution in 
Africa in March 2002, under the chair of Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul of Mauritius. Ireland 
was a strong supporter of the working group. In a Council briefing by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, David Stephen, Ireland argued that peace-building 
needed a strong economic foundation and that while the authorities in Guinea-Bissau had 
                                                 
61For background information on the Arria Formula see 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/arria.htm (25 May 2004). 
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their own responsibilities, the Bretton Woods institutions had to be sufficiently flexible in their 
dealing with the country so as to reinforce efforts at national reconciliation.62 ECOSOC was 
also supportive of this new institutional cooperation, and it was hoped that this might add to 
pressure on various international institutions to acknowledge and address the links between 
conflict and underlying social and economic situations.63
 
Relations with Troop Contributing Countries 
The Security Council held a number of discussions in January 2001 about ways to improve 
relations between the Council and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and in particular 
with those TCCs that provide ‘formed units’, which included Ireland.64 The Council decided 
to establish a working group to look at the issues involved.65 Ireland was very supportive of 
this process, especially as the country is effectively a ‘permanent’ TCC even though it is a 
‘non-permanent’ Security Council member. The five permanent UNSC members were all 
opposed to any significant change in relations. The first Council decisions, outlined in 
resolution 135312, set out some principles for guiding relations, but these were rejected by 
most TCCs as inadequate. Ireland continued to press the issues, especially during its 
presidency of the Council in October 2001. Eventually the permanent members, and last of 
all the US, modified their position and agreed to a new mechanism for structured inputs by 
TCCs into the Council.66 Whereas it did not go as far as they wished, most TCCs welcomed 
this new mechanism as an improved arrangement. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Three key questions can be asked of Ireland’s record on the Security Council during 2001–2. 
To what extent did Ireland follow a common EU policy; to what extent was the Irish 
delegation influenced by the country’s perceived economic dependence on the US; and, 
more broadly, does an analysis of Ireland’s performance suggest that small states can play a 
meaningful role on the UNSC?  
On the first question, in broad terms it is difficult to separate Ireland’s foreign policy 
from that of the EU’scommon foreign and security policy, in which Ireland plays a full role. 
National foreign policy-making now takes place so strongly within an EU framework that as 
Tonra noted the ‘external element of’ the EU had effectively been internalised with the 
national policy-making of the three small states in his study.67 However, many of the issues 
that came before the Security Council during Ireland’s period of membership were ones on 
which the EU did not have a common position and indeed on which the EU member states 
were clearly divided. Irish diplomats believe that they never voted against a common EU 
                                                 
62This briefing was given in a closed meeting on 8 July 2002. For the communiqué issued 
following the meeting see http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/463/35/PDF/N0246335.pdf?OpenElement (2 October 2004). 
63For a general statement of Irish policy in regard to cooperation between the UN and Central 
Africa in maintaining peace and security see http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc93.htm (15 May 
2004). 
64See, for example, details of the meeting of 16 January 2001, available at 
/http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (15 May 2004). 
65Details regarding this decision are available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/234/27/PDF/N0123427pdf?OpenElement (15 May 2004). 
12This resolution was passed on 13 June 2001.The full text is available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/409/44/PDF/N0140944.pdf?OpenElement (2 October 2004). 
66This was agreed in Council decision S/2001/56.Details are available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (15 May 2004). 
67Tonra, The Europeanisation of national foreign policy, 285. 
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position, but from some of the specifics in Iraq and the Middle East to issues related to 
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Western Sahara, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone the EU did not have a clear policy and Britain and France (the only other EU 
members on the Council at this time) followed their own, often differing, agendas leaving 
Ireland to also develop its own policy. As a result there is little evidence that Ireland was 
pressurised by its EU membership to take a particular stance on the controversial issues it 
confronted. This may, however, change over time as the common foreign and security policy 
becomes more effective and cohesive. 
Ireland was regarded as a ‘good European’by other EU member states while on the 
Council, primarily because the Irish delegation regularly briefed other EU states that were 
not on the Council and because the delegation was open to bilateral approaches for 
briefings from other EU members. Despite the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, 
this was, to say the least, not common practice and was certainly not something done by 
Britain and France. This, rather than issues of high politics, was the most notable impact of 
Ireland’s EU obligations on its performance on the UNSC . 
On the second question of US influence on Irish foreign policy, although Ireland 
worked within the constraints of the UN system, Irish diplomats certainly did not adopt a 
position of general support for US foreign policy. Ireland, in common with the wider 
international community, was strongly supportive of the US in the post-11 September 2001 
period. This can be seen most clearly in activity on the UNSC in late 2001, during debates 
on Afghanistan and in the discussions on the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). Even in 
regard to these matters, however, there were some minor issues of conflict between Ireland 
and the US. For example, Ireland was part of the group that pressurised the US and Britain 
to brief the Council immediately after they started their attack on Afghanistan. The US had 
simply wanted to write to the Council saying it was invoking its right of self-defence. Ireland 
also sought (unsuccessfully) to institutionalise a human-rights perspective within the work of 
the CTC.  
Ireland did, on many occasions, clearly oppose US policy on significant issues of 
importance to America, such as: 
• Palestine, on amny occasions 
•  sanctions against Iraq, the application of sanctions against al-Qaeda and on 
whether a second resolution was required to attack Iraq.  
On other less high-profile but nonetheless important issues, Ireland publicly and regularly 
opposed US policy. Such issues included: 
• seeking to re-engage the UN in Somalia;  
• the US attempt to alter UN policy on Western Sahara;  
• and the effort in January 2001 to end the arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
• In the wider debate on sanctions regimes in general, Ireland argued for specific 
time limits to be imposed for sanctions. This stance was in opposition to that taken 
by the US, which, mindful of its policy on sanctions in Iraq, sought to avoid such a 
definitive UN policy.  
 
In addition, Ireland, with limited impact, sought to apply a UN mandate to the NATO 
operation in FYROM, against US and British arguments. It also unsuccessfully sought to 
criticise the LURD group in Liberia, but it did help ensure a larger UN operation in Timor 
Leste against the wishes of the permanent UNSC members. Whereas Ireland eventually 
voted for the resolution that gave the US an effective exemption from the operation of the 
International Criminal Court, it was, with Mexico, one of the two last countries to agree to do 
so.  
Thus, Ireland’s performance on the UNSC during 2001 and 2002 is remarkable for 
the number of times the Irish delegation disagreed with the world’s most powerful state. In 
this arena at least, Irish diplomats displayed a relatively consistent support for 
multilateralism, for the UN system and for a humanitarian and human-rights based approach 
to international relations. However, Ireland’s term ended just before the US decision to 
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invade Iraq became irreversible. If Ireland had been on the Council at the time that 
happened, it would have found itself under much more pressure to conform to the US 
position than on any other issue with which the Council had dealt over the previous two 
years. 
On the final question of the potential for small states to have an impact on the 
Council the evidence is unclear. Ireland took a tactical decision not to use the Council as a 
platform to raise issues on which it had no hope of making progress. This was done in an 
effort to focus resources, but it does mean that Ireland’s actions on the Council are not a 
complete reflection of Irish foreign-policy concerns. Anglo-Irish relations, or issues related to 
the Northern Ireland conflict, for example, were never raised in the UNSC. Ambassador 
Ryan, in describing the delegation’s approach said ‘Diplomacy is the art of the possible. We 
don’t bring any high-flying notions to the council, and we have no colonial baggage or 
agenda that the Government needs to assert’.68
The Irish delegation seems to have decided not to vote against a resolution, simply to 
make a gesture, if that resolution was clearly going to pass. RESTORENo resolution, 
therefore, was passed during the two-year term that Ireland did not support. This position 
seems to have been adopted to avoid being isolated on any given issue and in a bid to 
strengthen the Irish delegation’s capacity to build coalitions of supporters on priority issues 
where the outcome was open. Such coalitions varied from issue to issue, and therefore all 
Council members were potential allies on some topic. Inevitably there were issues on which 
Ireland was outspoken but not successful in shifting the Council. For example:  
• on Palestine when the US used its veto; 
•  on pre-war Iraq sanctions where Ireland (in the company of France and Russia, it 
must be said) failed to achieve any significant humanitarian relaxation of the 
sanctions; 
•  on the ICC, where Ireland backed down on its opposition to an exemption for the 
US.; 
•  on the attempt to achieve the institutionalisation of human rights within the work 
of the Counter Terrorism Committee; 
•  on the effort to bring the NATO mission in FYROM under a UN mandate; 
 and in seeking to re-engage the UN in Somalia. 
Given the nature of the informal consultation process that takes place around Security 
Council decisions, it is difficult to isolate Ireland’s contribution to individual resolutions or to a 
successful move to block a resolution. Due to the way in which the voting rule of the Council 
operates, Ireland was part of a group of at least nine states for any resolution that passed (or 
that was vetoed), and part of a group of at least seven for any resolution  successfully 
resisted. Nonetheless, from the public record it is clear that there are a number of occasions 
when Ireland, in alliance with other smaller states, did have a meaningful, even decisive 
impact on the council: 
• In the successful effort to prevent the early lifting of the arms embargo on 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ireland was crucial to consolidating the position of the other 
new Council members—all of which were relatively small states. 
•  On Palestine, Ireland was part of a group that clearly tipped the balance on the 
Council towards support for Palestinian statehood. It was this bloc of nine, which 
included Ireland, that  was not open to US pressure on this issue in ‘informal 
consultations’ and that was willing to support motions favouring the Palestinian 
position, which forced the US to either constantly use its veto in public session or 
to modify its position—as happened in March and April 2002. 
•  On Western Sahara Ireland was clearly regarded as one of the lead states in 
upholding the rights of the Sahroaui people to self-determination (as enshrined in 
previous UN resolutions) and in successfully resisting  the efforts of the US, 
                                                 
68Deaglán de Breadún, ‘Irish UN delegation is small, but it focuses on the big issues’, Irish 
Times, 5 May 2001. 
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Britain and France to shift the UN towards effective support for the Moroccan 
position. 
•  On Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, Ireland and others strengthened UN 
engagement against cost-cutting pressures from the five permanent UNSC 
members. 
Ireland’s record during its two years on the Council is overwhelmingly one of support 
for the UN system and for multilateralism. In this regard, Ireland acts in accordance with 
Keohane’s predictions. However, Ireland’s interventions were not those of a state seeking to 
strengthen its own autonomy. Neither did Ireland prominently advance its own narrow 
national interests on the Council.  There is certainly no evidence that the Irish delegation felt 
constrained not to oppose US foreign policy because of Ireland’s economic position. Neither 
is there any evidence of undue pressure due to EU obligations. Ireland’s interventions were 
often made in areas in keeping with its declared support for a liberal multilateral world order 
and where its position had no other motivation based on national interests. Over the two 
years, therefore, Ireland’s diplomatic team can be said to have made a difference. 
 
 
